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review: Jonathan Haidt The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology Science 2007; 316: 998-1002 [Abstract] [Full text] [PDF]

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Beyond the Classical Dual Nature of Moral Behavior

Sébastien Tassy, Olivier Oullier, Bruno Wicker   (13 August 2007)

Beyond the Classical Dual Nature of Moral Behavior 13 August 2007
Sébastien Tassy Mediterranean Institute of Cognitive Neurosciences, UMR 6193 CNRS-University of Provence, Marseille, Olivier Oullier, Bruno Wicker Respond to this E-Letter: Re: Beyond the Classical Dual Nature of Moral Behavior	J. Haidt suggested in a recent Review in Science (18 May 2007, p. 998) that future research on moral cognition should offer views that go beyond the sole principles of harm and fairness (1). In agreement with this view we propose that commonly used moral dilemmas (2–4) should be considered with respect to major stages in the evolution of human behavior. The most primitive behavior of a single individual involves decisions motivated by ensuring his own survival. During the Pleistocene, life in small groups resulted in genetic changes influenced by culture (culture/gene co-evolution,) that led to the emergence of social instincts favoring kin or the welfare of tribe members. Finally, over the past 10,000 years, social evolution resulted in culturally shaped rules that took advantage of a psychology that had evolved to cooperate with in-group members and so expanded the benefits of social instincts to larger/anonymous social systems (5). At the neurobiological level, this improvement of social norms likely necessitated an adaptation of conscious/rational cerebral processes to drive functional adjustment and novel coordination with more automatic intuitive/affective mechanisms. The study of these neurobiological substrates could benefit from consideration of the evolutionary stages to better accommodate behavioral decisions according to which social group they may benefit or harm. We argue for a psychological model of decisionmaking in moral dilemmas where three neural mechanisms coexist: one very primitive that mostly favors self-interest; another more automatic intuitive/affective favoring welfare of kin/in-group members; and a third conscious/rational mechanism implementing norms that favor large groups. Consequently, moral dilemmas could be sorted according to the kind of benefit they address. Such clear-cut distinctions remain theoretical in nature since, in real-life, contextual influences have a crucial role in triggering feelings that can have a critical impact on moral judgments (e.g., empathy). However, in our opinion, this framework would help refine experimental paradigms and analyses when subtle social contextual information changes are at stake in moral and economic dilemmas. Sébastien Tassy Mediterranean Institute of Cognitive Neurosciences, UMR 6193 CNRS-University of Provence, Marseille, France, and Mediterranean Ethical forum, EA 3783, University Hospital, Marseille, France. Olivier Oullier Human Neurobiology Laboratory, UMR 6149, University of Provence-CNRS, Marseille, France. Bruno Wicker Mediterranean Ethical Forum, EA 3783, University Hospital, Marseille, France. References 1. J. Haidt, Science 316, 998 (2007). 2. J. D. Greene, L. E. Nystrom, A. D. Engell, J. M. Darley, J. D. Cohen, Neuron 44, 389 (2004). 3. D. Knoch, A. Pascual-Leone, K. Meyer, V. Treyer, E. Fehr, Science 314, 829 (2006). 4. M. Koenigs et al., Nature 446, 908 (2007). 5. P. J. Richerson, R. T. Boyd, J. Henrich, in Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation, P. Hammerstein, Ed. (MIT Press, Berlin, 2003), pp. 357-388.