E-Letter responses to:

essays: Matthew K. Chew and Manfred D. Laubichler PERCEPTIONS OF SCIENCE: Natural Enemies--Metaphor or Misconception? Science 2003; 301: 52-53 [Summary] [Full text] [PDF]

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Published E-Letter responses:

Copying metaphors

Alexander Voegtli   (24 May 2005)

The Constructive Use of Metaphor in Ecology

John M Drake   (5 September 2003)

Writing for Science - Education

D.F. McKeen   (28 July 2003)

Copying metaphors 24 May 2005
Alexander Voegtli, Ph.D. Student, Pharmacist Institute of Molecular Pharmacy, University of Basel, Switzerland Respond to this E-Letter: Re: Copying metaphors	The article contains an instructive imprecision. William Paley finds the watch in his metaphor not at the beach but on a heath: "In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the stone came to be there; I might possibly answer, that, for any thing I knew to the contrary, it had lain there for ever: nor would it perhaps be very easy to show the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I had found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place; I should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that, for any thing I knew, the watch might have always been there. " William Paley, 1809 (1). A brief analysis of this imprecision leads to interesting conclusions. The origin of the confusion is unclear, but it is safe to assume that the semantic, phonetic, and optical similarity between the words heath and beach is involved. Also, the word heath is not as commonly used as the word beach. An inquiry with Google shows that the confusion is very popular on the internet. This can probably be explained by the process of copying. This process is also very important in the dissemination of metaphors. The late Stephen J. Gould showed that the standard comparison for the size of the fossil horse Eohippus (Hyracotherium) in textbooks is the fox terrier (2). This comparison was established through continual copying and re-copying. The problem is that most of us probably do not know what a fox terrier really looks like. Thus, the comparison is not reasonable. Besides mental and textual metaphors, pictorial metaphors are also very often copied. This is one of the reasons why scientific images often look very similar, which can constrain our thoughts. Copying may also prevent us from incorporating new findings into a scientific image. A new theory therefore often requries a new image. A popular example is Fischer’s static “lock- key” metaphor for the enzyme-substrate interaction. It was later extended by Koshland’s dynamic induced fit metaphor with the new image of a “hand in a glove” (3, 4). 1. W. Paley, Natural Theology (J.Faulder, London, 12th ed., 1809). 2. S. J. Gould, "The case of the creeping fox terrier," in Bully for Brontosaurus: Reflections in Natural History (Hutchinson Radius, London, 1991). 3. E. Fischer, Einfluss der Configuration auf die Wirkung der Enzyme, Ber. Deutschen Chem. Ges. 27 (no. 3), 2985-2993 (1809). 4. D. E. Koshland, Application of a theory of enzyme specificity to protein synthesis, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 44, 98–104 (1958).
The Constructive Use of Metaphor in Ecology 5 September 2003
John M Drake University of Notre Dame Respond to this E-Letter: Re: The Constructive Use of Metaphor in Ecology	Semantic indefiniteness is a feature of all human discourses, even technical discourses, and cannot therefore be eliminated even from science. Chew and Laubichler (4 July pp. 52-53) have pointed out (correctly, in my opinion) that metaphor, colloquialism, and figures of speech pervade modern ecological theory. They are “troubled”, with good reason, that “biology’s metaphorical abstractions all too easily become concrete objects.” Much environmental policy is buttressed by the latest developments in ecological theory. If it is true that not only public opinion, but professional and expert judgments too, are straightjacketed by wayward anthropomorphisms, then the obstacles to interpreting scientific theory in policy-relevant ways are indeed enormous. While desiring to avoid naïveté about the ways in which science and the public’s perceptions of science are bound by their language-ladenness (to paraphrase a philosophical slogan), I also believe that scientists and policy-makers can be both sincere about their uses of theory and exhibit reserved confidence in their interpretations of empirical results, even if they are pervaded by metaphor. I am more interested, therefore, in the constructive uses of metaphor in science. Chew and Laubichler identify one: metaphors require that we bring to their interpretation a context that is already rich in connotations, rendering complicated natural processes conceivable to limited minds and therefore also scientifically tractable. I think that metaphor serves another function too. It creates a space of possibility for theorizing, either by causing us to question the pertinence of a particular metaphor or by spotlighting opportunities for developing a general theory. In my view, this is precisely what has occurred in the case of “natural enemies” scrutinized by Chew and Laubichler. They wonder what it is that makes all the specific instances of natural enemies of a piece. The answer is that they all are cases of exploitation between pairs of species. Exploitative interactions are those with asymmetrical fitness consequences and are therefore of special interest for the evolution of life histories and the theory of population regulation. By classifying natural enemies together and distinguishing them from other kinds of interactions (mutualisms and competitions) ecologists seek a more general theory of interspecific interactions (1). Chew and Laubichler do not see why the general concept of “natural enemies” might ever be preferable to more precise concepts like “herbivory.” But, so also, others might wish to distinguish herbivory by ungulates from that of insects or of other taxa, i.e. from more precise instances of it. Should we also then dispense with the concept of herbivory simpliciter? I suspect not. 1. Crawley, M.J. 1992. Natural Enemies: The Population Biology of Predators, Parasites and Diseases. Blackwell: Oxford.
Writing for Science - Education 28 July 2003
D.F. McKeen, biology undergraduate Respond to this E-Letter: Re: Writing for Science - Education	The art of writing science is, I am learning, rather like walking a tightrope with no net underneath. Every word chosen offers the science writer the unfortunate opportunity to be imprecise, innacurate, or both. It seems to me that there are a few ways to improve language and the general conveyance of ideas in scientific writing. Professional science editors should be more stringent about language use before publishing science papers of any kind. Within higher education institutions, the problems inherent in science writing become evident to professors and students alike during the undergraduate years. Not all higher education institutions offer students hard-core science writing classes, which could account for the proliferation of less than ideal writing observed in working graduates today. Students like myself plod through ecology, animal behavior, and other classes, clumsily attempting to sound like real scientists in our papers and essays. Most undergraduates are not trained to be wary of imprecise language in the professional papers we are studying. Many schools do not offer hard-core science writing classes. They only offer classes like technical writing. In the latter scenario, we students are only taught to be wary of our own imprecision. If the data (published research papers) we are interpreting are imprecise, and our professors do not catch our errors, we will only continue to spew out our interpretations of inaccurate metaphors, etc., when we enter the professional world of writing for science. In the process, we too will proliferate the current trend of boiling down issues to a clear, palatable broth of toxic information. And the public will be none the wiser.