Note to users. If you're seeing this message, it means that your browser cannot find this page's style/presentation instructions -- or possibly that you are using a browser that does not support current Web standards. Find out more about why this message is appearing, and what you can do to make your experience of our site the best it can be.

Science 7 April 2006:
Vol. 312. no. 5770, p. 15
DOI: 10.1126/science.312.5770.15g
Prev | Table of Contents | Next

This Week in Science

Societal behavior is complex and multifaceted. One complicated question is the conditions under which we cooperate with others for mutual gain. Experimental results using a public goods game suggest that the threat of costly punishment of free-riders by altruistically minded souls suffices to maintain groupwide compliance. Gürerk et al. (p. 108; see the Perspective by Henrich) show that if allowed to choose freely, individuals first elect to join a sanction-free game where punishment is not permitted. As successive rounds are played, they come to appreciate that cooperation yields greater rewards, so they switch to the sanctioning regime where punishment (which makes free-riding costly) is allowed and themselves become active monitors of compliance.




To Advertise     Find Products

Science. ISSN 0036-8075 (print), 1095-9203 (online)