Note to users. If you're seeing this message, it means that your browser cannot find this page's style/presentation instructions -- or possibly that you are using a browser that does not support current Web standards. Find out more about why this message is appearing, and what you can do to make your experience of our site the best it can be.

Science 5 May 2000:
Vol. 288. no. 5467, pp. 850 - 852
DOI: 10.1126/science.288.5467.850
Prev | Table of Contents | Next

Reports

Cooperation Through Image Scoring in Humans

Claus Wedekind, 12*dagger Manfred Milinski 1ddagger

The "tragedy of the commons," that is, the selfish exploitation of resources in the public domain, is a reason for many of our everyday social conflicts. However, humans are often more helpful to others than evolutionary theory would predict, unless indirect reciprocity takes place and is based on image scoring (which reflects the way an individual is viewed by a group), as recently shown by game theorists. We tested this idea under conditions that control for confounding factors. Donations were more frequent to receivers who had been generous to others in earlier interactions. This shows that image scoring promotes cooperative behavior in situations where direct reciprocity is unlikely.

1 Abteilung Verhaltensökologie, Zoologisches Institut, Universität Bern, 3032 Hinterkappelen, Switzerland.
2 Department of Biology, West Main Road, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT 84112, USA.
*   Present address: Institute of Cell, Animal and Population Biology, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh EH9 3JT, UK.

dagger    To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: claus.wedekind{at}ed.ac.uk

ddagger    Present address: Department of Evolutionary Ecology, Max-Planck-Institute for Limnology, D-24306 Plön, Germany.

Read the Full Text


THIS ARTICLE HAS BEEN CITED BY OTHER ARTICLES:
Eyes are on us, but nobody cares: are eye cues relevant for strong reciprocity?.
E. Fehr and F. Schneider (2010)
Proc R Soc B
   Abstract »    Full Text »    PDF »
Indirect Punishment and Generosity Toward Strangers.
A. Ule, A. Schram, A. Riedl, and T. N. Cason (2009)
Science 326, 1701-1704
   Abstract »    Full Text »    PDF »
Disrupting the prefrontal cortex diminishes the human ability to build a good reputation.
D. Knoch, F. Schneider, D. Schunk, M. Hohmann, and E. Fehr (2009)
PNAS 106, 20895-20899
   Abstract »    Full Text »    PDF »
The evolution of judgement bias in indirect reciprocity.
D. J Rankin and F. Eggimann (2009)
Proc R Soc B 276, 1339-1345
   Abstract »    Full Text »    PDF »
Groups Reward Individual Sacrifice: The Status Solution to the Collective Action Problem.
R. Willer (2009)
American Sociological Review 74, 23-43
   Abstract »    PDF »
Recordkeeping alters economic history by promoting reciprocity.
S. Basu, J. Dickhaut, G. Hecht, K. Towry, and G. Waymire (2009)
PNAS 106, 1009-1014
   Abstract »    Full Text »    PDF »
Between-group competition and human cooperation.
M. Puurtinen and T. Mappes (2009)
Proc R Soc B 276, 355-360
   Abstract »    Full Text »    PDF »
The role of social cognition in decision making.
C. D Frith and T. Singer (2008)
Phil Trans R Soc B 363, 3875-3886
   Abstract »    Full Text »    PDF »
Multiple gossip statements and their effect on reputation and trustworthiness.
R. D Sommerfeld, H.-J. Krambeck, and M. Milinski (2008)
Proc R Soc B 275, 2529-2536
   Abstract »    Full Text »    PDF »
Neural Correlates of Human Virtue Judgment.
H. Takahashi, M. Kato, M. Matsuura, M. Koeda, N. Yahata, T. Suhara, and Y. Okubo (2008)
Cereb Cortex 18, 1886-1891
   Abstract »    Full Text »    PDF »
Altruism and Indirect Reciprocity: The Interaction of Person and Situation in Prosocial Behavior.
B. Simpson and R. Willer (2008)
Social Psychology Quarterly 71, 37-52
   Abstract »    PDF »
Gambling for global goods.
A. Dreber and M. A. Nowak (2008)
PNAS 105, 2261-2262
   Full Text »    PDF »
Evolution of direct and indirect reciprocity.
G. Roberts (2008)
Proc R Soc B 275, 173-179
   Abstract »    Full Text »    PDF »
Indirect reciprocity in asymmetric interactions: when apparent altruism facilitates profitable exploitation.
R. A Johnstone and R. Bshary (2007)
Proc R Soc B 274, 3175-3181
   Abstract »    Full Text »    PDF »
Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity.
R. D. Sommerfeld, H.-J. Krambeck, D. Semmann, and M. Milinski (2007)
PNAS 104, 17435-17440
   Abstract »    Full Text »    PDF »
Probabilistic participation in public goods games.
T. Sasaki, I. Okada, and T. Unemi (2007)
Proc R Soc B 274, 2639-2642
   Abstract »    Full Text »    PDF »
The Social Exchange Heuristic: Managing Errors in Social Exchange.
T. Yamagishi, S. Terai, T. Kiyonari, N. Mifune, and S. Kanazawa (2007)
Rationality and Society 19, 259-291
   Abstract »    PDF »
Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment.
C. Hauert, A. Traulsen, H. Brandt, M. A. Nowak, and K. Sigmund (2007)
Science 316, 1905-1907
   Abstract »    Full Text »    PDF »
Upstream reciprocity and the evolution of gratitude.
M. A Nowak and S. Roch (2007)
Proc R Soc B 274, 605-610
   Abstract »    Full Text »    PDF »
Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation.
M. A. Nowak (2006)
Science 314, 1560-1563
   Abstract »    Full Text »    PDF »
Reactions to Internal and External Criticism of Outgroups: Social Convention in the Intergroup Sensitivity Effect.
R. M. Sutton, T. J. Elder, and K. M. Douglas (2006)
Pers Soc Psychol Bull 32, 563-575
   Abstract »    PDF »
Stabilizing the Earth's climate is not a losing game: Supporting evidence from public goods experiments..
M. Milinski, D. Semmann, H.-J. Krambeck, and J. Marotzke (2006)
PNAS 103, 3994-3998
   Abstract »    Full Text »    PDF »
Reputation and the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups.
S. Suzuki and E. Akiyama (2005)
Proc R Soc B 272, 1373-1377
   Abstract »    Full Text »    PDF »
A Stage Model of Blood Donor Behaviour: Assessing Volunteer Behaviour.
E. Ferguson and S. Chandler (2005)
J Health Psychol 10, 359-372
   Abstract »    PDF »
Indirect reciprocity, image scoring, and moral hazard.
H. Brandt and K. Sigmund (2005)
PNAS 102, 2666-2670
   Abstract »    Full Text »    PDF »
The Power of Reciprocity: Fairness, Reciprocity, and Stakes in Variants of the Dictator Game.
A. Diekmann (2004)
Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, 487-505
   Abstract »    PDF »
Evolutionary Dynamics of Biological Games.
M. A. Nowak and K. Sigmund (2004)
Science 303, 793-799
   Abstract »    Full Text »    PDF »
Volunteering as Red Queen Mechanism for Cooperation in Public Goods Games.
C. Hauert, S. De Monte, J. Hofbauer, and K. Sigmund (2002)
Science 296, 1129-1132
   Abstract »    Full Text »    PDF »
A functional imaging study of cooperation in two-person reciprocal exchange.
K. McCabe, D. Houser, L. Ryan, V. Smith, and T. Trouard (2001)
PNAS
   Abstract »    Full Text »    PDF »
Reward and punishment.
K. Sigmund, C. Hauert, and M. A. Nowak (2001)
PNAS 98, 10757-10762
   Abstract »    Full Text »    PDF »
Fairness Versus Reason in the Ultimatum Game.
M. A. Nowak, K. M. Page, and K. Sigmund (2000)
Science 289, 1773-1775
   Abstract »    Full Text »
A functional imaging study of cooperation in two-person reciprocal exchange.
K. McCabe, D. Houser, L. Ryan, V. Smith, and T. Trouard (2001)
PNAS 98, 11832-11835
   Abstract »    Full Text »    PDF »


To Advertise     Find Products

Science. ISSN 0036-8075 (print), 1095-9203 (online)