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Science 23 October 1987:
Vol. 238. no. 4826, pp. 455 - 459
DOI: 10.1126/science.238.4826.455

Articles

Science, Vol 238, Issue 4826, 455-459
Copyright © 1987 by American Association for the Advancement of Science


articles

HAROLD A. FEIVESON, CHRISTOPHER E. PAINE, and FRANK VON HIPPEL

Research scholar at the Center for Energy and Environmental Studies and an affiliate of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08540

Staff consultant both to Princeton and Senator Edward M. Kennedy. Professor of public and international affairs at Princeton University.

At present, nuclear explosions are limited by treaty to underground testing with yields of no more than 150 kilotons, and recently there have been renewed calls for further test restrictions. As part of these discussions, the U.S. Congress is considering bills that would legislate new limits to testing,whereas the Reagan Administration opposes such constraints. The editors of Science have asked two groups of participants in the debate to present their arguments for or against new limits to testing. Feiveson, Paine, and von Hippel argue for a treaty of indefinite duration between the United States and the Soviet Union, which includes the following provisions: (i) a ban on all testing outside a desiqnated site having known seismic properties; (ii)verification by means of on-site inspection and in-country seismic monitoring; (iii) unlimited testing below 1 kiloton at the special site; and (iv) an average of one test per year with a yield of up to 15 kilotons for ensuring reliability of the nuclear stockpile. MiUer, Brown, and Nordyke argue that a lowering of the present 150-kiloton threshold would be undesirable, and that new test bans would divert attention from a comprehensive approach to negotiated reductions in the nuclear and conventional arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union.





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Science. ISSN 0036-8075 (print), 1095-9203 (online)